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Abstract— Dynamic ad hoc networks facilitate interconnec-
tions between mobile devices without the support of any net-
work infrastructure. In this paper, we propose a secure
identity-based ad hoc protocol for mobile devices to construct
a group key for a setup of a secure communication network
in an efficient way and support dynamic changing of network
topology. Unlike group key management protocols proposed
previously in the literature, mobile devices can use our proto-
col to construct the group key by observing the others’ identity,
like the MAC address, which distinguishes the device from the
others. In contrast to other interactive protocols, we only need
one broadcast to setup the group key and member removal is
also highly efficient. Finally, we discuss the security issues and
provide security proofs for our protocol.
Keywords— dynamic mobile ad hoc network, identity-based,
non-interactive, secure communication protocol, group key
management.
1. Introduction
Many modern computing environments involve dynamic ad
hoc networks. Ad hoc networks facilitate interconnections
between mobile devices without the need of support for any
network infrastructure. When a mobile ad hoc network is
formed in an open network environment, all intended and
unintended devices can listen and observe the broadcasted
communication since wireless signal cannot be hidden un-
derground like wired networks. Security is becoming cru-
cial in this environment. Therefore, the content of the com-
munication must be protected so that only group members
in the ad hoc group can obtain the information. Hence,
a secure communication protocol and a robust group key
management scheme are required to provide strong protec-
tion for group communication.
A naive approach to provide a secure communication in
this environment is to share a common key, K , among the
group members, and this key will be used to encrypt and
decrypt each message sent among them. The drawbacks of
this approach are as follows:
• This protocol requires prior distribution of K before
the network can be formed, which turns out to be
inefficient when the key needs to be updated.
• This protocol does not support the dynamics of the
group. When a group member decides to leave the
group, the key K ′ 6= K needs to be redistributed
among the rest of the group members, which is inef-
ficient.
• It is not possible to create a subgroup within the
group, since everyone holds the same key.
Another important issue that needs to be considered in an
ad hoc network is the trusted authority (TA). Group mem-
bers should be able to form their network at anytime be-
cause of the mobility of ad hoc network. Hence, we cannot
expect an online TA who can always redistribute a key K
whenever needed. A common solution to avoid the need
of TA is to employ Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange pro-
tocol where two parties can come up with the same key K
by exchanging their own random secret interactively and
use them to construct the key K [1]. Although this pro-
tocol can only supports two-party, some recent researches
have shown that the extension to multiple-party protocol
is possible [2–5]. The drawbacks of this approach are as
follows:
• The group members must engage in an extensive pro-
tocol during the key setup phase. Usually, a leader
or a root in the protocol is required to initialize the
protocol.
• Depending on the number of group members, the
total number of message exchanges can be large when
a new key is required (e.g., when a new member
joins).
• Due to the large number of message exchanges and
the need of leader role, some of the group members
may perform more calculations than others (the fair-
ness problem) depending on the key management hi-
erarchy (message exchange order of group members
for setting up a new key) being adopted.
This is not encouraged in mobile ad hoc networks, since
normally each group member is equipped with a device that
has a very limited battery life. Having to perform a huge
computation will simply mean that it will drain the battery
of the device.
Conceptually, the idea proposed in [6, 7] by incorporat-
ing multilinear map may provide a good solution to this
key setup problem. In their setting, each group member
supplies their own random secret and broadcast it to other
group members. Then they can construct a new group
key in one round by using the multilinear map compu-
tation method. Unfortunately, at this stage, research has
not successfully shown that the concrete construction of
multilinear map exists. The existing map is the bilinear
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map in which Joux showed how to extend the DH key ex-
change protocol into a tripartite one round version using
this map [8]. Barua, Dutta and Sharkar combine the bi-
linear map with the traditional DH key exchange protocol
to construct a tree-based group key management protocol
in [9]. Nevertheless, these protocols have not solved the
fairness issue mentioned earlier, since some group mem-
bers still need to perform more computations compared
with others.
Having considered the main disadvantages of using key
management protocols to setup the group key for mobile
ad hoc group, we propose a new protocol which does not
require the group members to perform any message ex-
changes during the generation process of group key. To
achieve this goal, we incorporate the identity-based cryp-
tosystem [10] with a bilinear map and pairing computa-
tion [11] to replace the contributory setup of a group key as
seen in other literature [1–9]. Each group member is treated
as a broadcaster in which he can select the designated re-
ceiver(s)(the whole ad hoc group or part of it) by himself
and encrypt the message(key) that is only decipherable by
them. Unlike previous protocols, our protocol avoids mas-
sive message exchanges for key setup that are sent between
group members. Each group member is only required to
broadcast one message to setup the group key, and hence,
it is most efficient in terms of message exchanges and it
provides fairness to every group members. They can also
assure that only the designated receiver(s) can decrypt the
message(key). We shall note that our protocol is perfect for
a small group of people who would like to form a mobile
ad hoc network. We would also like to point out that in
a mobile ad hoc network, it is not common to have a very
large group.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we will provide some mathematical backgrounds
that will be used to construct our scheme. In Section 3,
we will provide our proposed scheme follow by a security
analysis. Section 4 will conclude the paper.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we describe the mathematical tools that will
be used in our scheme.
2.1. Bilinear map and pairing
Let G1 be an additive group of points on an elliptic curve
and G2 be a multiplicative group of a finite field. The order
of both groups, |G1|= |G2|= q, where q is a large prime
and the discrete logarithm problem in Z∗q is intractable.
In the following, let P1, P2, P, Q ∈ G1 be the generators,
and a, b∈Z∗q. A bilinear map eˆ : G1×G1 → G2 is a func-
tion that:
• is bilinear:
– eˆ(aP,bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)ab,
– eˆ(P1 +P2,Q) = eˆ(P1,Q)eˆ(P2,Q);
• is non-degenerate:
– for any generator P ∈G1, eˆ(P,P) 6= 1;
• is computable:
– there exists an efficient algorithm that can com-
pute the map in polynomial time.
A pairing is an efficient algorithm to compute the mapping
between G1 and G2 for all generators in G1. Modified Weil
pairing is one of the pairings that has been used frequently
in recent cryptographic applications [8, 11–13].
2.2. Identity-based cryptosystem
In an identity-based cryptosystem (or ID-based, for short),
users are not bound to certificates and no online trusted
authorities are required to verify the validity of their cer-
tificate. They are bound to their unique identifier (ID)
and their private key is obtained from a key generation
center (KGC) while their public key is determined with
their ID. The center, KGC, can go off-line after the setup
of common system parameters and the distribution of keys
to users. Later on, one of the two users Alice and Bob,
say Alice, wants to send a message to Bob, she can encrypt
the message using the public key computed from the ID
(name, e-mail address, etc., as long as it can be used to
uniquely identify the user) of Bob. The encrypted mes-
sage can only be decrypted by Bob using his private key
previously obtained from the KGC.
Currently the well known ID-based encryption scheme [11]
that incorporates the bilinear map and pairing is as follows.
The ID-based cryptosystem proposed by Boneh and
Franklin:
• Setup. KGC generates two groups (G1,+) the ad-
ditive group and (G2, ·) the multiplicative group both
with prime order q together with a bilinear map
eˆ : (G1,+)
2
→ (G2, ·). It also selects an arbitrary
generator P ∈ G1, then picks s ∈ Z∗q randomly and
sets Ppub = sP as its public key, where s denotes
the master secret key. Finally, two cryptographically
strong hash functions are selected: F : {0,1}∗→G1,
H : G2 → {0,1}n, where n denotes the size of the
plaintext message space. The system parameters
and their descriptions are made public in a tuple
{G1,G2, eˆ,q,n,P,Ppub,F,H} while the master secret
key s is kept secret.
• Extract. After performing physical identification of
a user, say Alice, and making sure the uniqueness of
her IDAlice, KGC generates her secret key as follows.
It computes QIDAlice = F(IDAlice) and sets SIDAlice =
sQIDAlice . SIDAlice is given to Alice as her secret key.
It is the same for Bob where his identity is IDBob and
his secret key SIDBob = sQIDBob .
• Encrypt. To send an encrypted message to Bob,
Alice first obtains the system parameters and uses
Bob’s identity to compute QIDBob = F(IDBob). Then,
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to encrypt a message m ∈ {0,1}n, Alice picks
r ∈ Z∗q randomly and computes rP and gIDBob =
eˆ(QIDBob ,Ppub)r. The ciphertext is C = (rP,m ⊕
H(gIDBob)).
• Decrypt. Let C = (U,V ) be the ciphertext received
by Bob. To decrypt C using his private key SIDBob ,
he computes gIDBob = eˆ(SIDBob ,U) = eˆ(sQIDBob ,rP) =
eˆ(QIDBob ,sP)r = eˆ(QIDBob ,Ppub)r. The message is
m = V ⊕H(gIDBob).
2.3. Single encryption and multiple decryptions
In [14], a new public key based cryptosystem was pro-
posed where there is one public encryption key and multiple
decryption keys. It works by considering the polynomial
function:
f (x) =
n
∏
i=1
(x− xi)≡
n
∑
i=0
aix
i
,
where ai denotes the coefficient corresponding to x
i af-
ter the expansion of f (x), i.e., a0 = ∏ni=1(−xi), a1 =
∑ni=1 ∏nj 6=i(−x j), . . . , an−1 = ∑ni=1(−xi), an = 1 (note that
f (xi),1 ≤ i ≤ n is equal to 0).
Under this construction, any generator g∈Z∗q rises to power
f (x), i.e., g f (x) mod q (q is a large prime) will give the
result equals to 1 for x = xi, i = 1 . . .n. (We assume the
calculations in this paper are under modulo q and will omit
the (mod q) notation in the rest of the paper where it is
obvious from the context).
With this property, we let x1,x2, . . . ,xn be the private de-
cryption keys of user U1,U2, . . . ,Un, respectively, and
{g0,g1,g2, . . . ,gn} = {ga0 ,ga1 ,ga2 , . . . ,gan} be the public
encryption key tuple. Then a message m can be encrypted
as m ·gr0 by choosing a random number r ∈ Z
∗
q and sending
C = {m ·gr0,gr1,gr2, . . . ,grn} as the ciphertext. The encrypted
message can be decrypted by any one of the users by using
his own private key xi to calculate:
m ·gr0 ·
n
∏
j=1
grx
j
i
j = m ·
n
∏
j=0
grx
j
i
j
= m ·g∑
n
j=0 a jx
j
i ·r
= m ·g f (xi)·r
= m ·1r = m .
3. Our proposed scheme
3.1. Security model
3.1.1. System model
In our paper, we consider the situation where a group
of users are selected as a subset from the user set U =
{U1,U2, . . . ,Uk} who would like to form a mobile ad hoc
network by using their wireless devices. There exists a key
generation center that sets up system parameters, generates
and distributes private keys as described in Subsection 2.2.
The KGC will accept any person’s ID. Upon successful
verification of the ID, KGC generates the private key as-
sociated with the ID provided. The n users in set U are
those who have contacted the KGC to obtain their private
key and have their ID being known by each user within the
set. We note that the KGC’s role is only to provide the
necessary system parameters and distribute each user his
private key, hence the KGC is not necessary to keep online
after the completion of these procedures and is not required
anymore by the users who want to setup a mobile ad hoc
network, which fulfill the infrastructureless requirement of
dynamic ad hoc networks.
3.1.2. Adversary model
We assume there exists an adversary A 6∈U . All messages
available in the network are also available to A . This
includes all the messages sent by any set of users ⊂U that
wishes to create a mobile ad hoc network. The main goal
of A is to deviate the protocol by decrypting any messages
sent within the network intended to any set of users ⊂U
but not him. A is considered to be successful if he wins
in the following experiment.
Indistinguishability of encryptions under adaptive chosen
plaintext attack (IND-CPA):
1. A picks a group of user IDs to be attacked and tells
the challenger C .
2. C runs the KGC’s Setup algorithm to generate the
necessary system parameters and his private key. The
parameters are given to A while C keeps his private
key secret.
3. A can query C up to qH hash queries on any ID he
wants and up to qE extraction queries on any ID not
equal to the IDs he picked in Step 1. C will reply
with proper hash results on those IDs and runs the
Extract algorithm to reply A the private keys he
needs.
4. Meanwhile, A will select two messages {m0,m1}
and gives them to C . C will then pick one of them
randomly by flipping a fair coin to obtain b ∈ {0,1}.
C runs the Encrypt algorithm on mb using the IDs
picked by A in Step 1 to get the ciphertext C and
gives it back to A without letting him knows which
message is being picked.
5. A can keep on querying C the hash or extract values
if the total numbers of queries have not exceeded qH
and qE .
6. Eventually A will make a guess b′ ∈ {0,1} on which
message was being picked by C .
If A somehow managed to guess the correct answer
(i.e., b′ = b) in the experiment on the protocol above
then A wins the experiment and the protocol is not secure.
We say that A has a guessing advantage ε that the prob-
ability of A winning the experiment is P[b′ = b] = 12 + ε .
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A protocol is said to be secure against IND-CPA if there
exist no adversaries with advantage ε that can win the ex-
periment within qH +qE queries, in other words ε is neg-
ligible.
3.1.3. Security properties
Our protocol is secure against IND-CPA, which means no
adversaries can decrypt the messages sent within the net-
work not intended to them. If we consider the messages
as some group keys in different sessions, we obtain a se-
cure group key management method with the following
properties:
1. Group key secrecy. The group key is computationally
infeasible to compute.
2. Known session key secrecy. Even if one or more pre-
vious group session keys are exposed, the current or
future session keys are still secure.
3. Forward secrecy. If one or more group members’
private key are exposed, only the previous session
keys are revealed, the current or future session keys
are still secure.
4. Key control secrecy. The group key is randomly con-
structed and can not be predicted.
3.2. System construction
Our protocol incorporates the ID-based cryptosystem [10]
and its construction using a bilinear map and pairing [11]
together with the single encryption and multiple decryption
method [14] to create a secure and efficient communication
protocol for mobile ad hoc network.
For simplicity, we assume that each of the users
Ui ∈ U has contacted the KGC to obtain their ID-
based private key SIDi = sF(IDi). The system parame-
ters {G1, G2, eˆ, q, n, P, Ppub, F, H} are publicly known and
each user’s ID is known within the user group U . These
procedures can be done at anytime before the network is
formed.
Let there be a set of users U and a subset U
′
⊂U of size
n wanting to form a mobile ad hoc group. Let Us denote
a group member who joins U
′
and wants to broadcast
a message (or session key) to the rest of group. We refer
to U
′
∪{Us} as the current group. Our protocol works as
follows:
• Setup. Given the system parameters as described
above, each of the group members in the current
group will perform the following calculations:
– Select a random number r ∈ Z∗q, set R = rP.
– For n other group members in the current group,
calculate ei = H(eˆ(Ppub,rF(IDi))), i = 1 . . .n.
– Use the ei values to construct the polynomial
function f (e) = ∏ni=1(e− ei) = ∑ni=0 aiei.
– Compute {g0,g1, . . . ,gn}= {ga0 ,ga1 , ...,gan}.
After this phase, each group member is equipped
with a different encryption key tuple {g0, g1, . . . ,
gn, R}. This tuple will not change throughout the
whole session as long as the group topology does
not change and none of the private keys of current
group members has been exposed.
• Encrypt. Let m be the message (or new session
key). Us will perform the following calculations to
encrypt m and broadcast it to the rest of current group
members:
– Select two random numbers k1,k2 ∈ Z∗q.
– Raise each component in the encryption tuple
to power k2, i.e., calculate {gk20 ,g
k2
1 , . . . ,g
k2
n }.
– Encrypt the message m as Z = m⊕k1 and com-
pute A = k1 ·gk20 .
– Broadcast C = {Z,A,gk21 , . . . ,g
k2
n ,R}.
• Decrypt. Upon receiving the broadcast message
from Us, each user in current group can decrypt the
message with the following calculations:
– Compute ei = H(eˆ(R,SIDi)) using his private
key SIDi .
– Compute k = A ·∏nj=1 g
k2·e
j
i
j .
– m = Z⊕ k.
Note that the computation H(eˆ(R,SIDi)) = H(eˆ(rP,
sF(IDi))) = H(eˆ(sP,rF(IDi))) = H(eˆ(Ppub,rF(IDi)))
and A ·∏nj=1 g
k2·e
j
i
j =k1 ·g
k2
0 ·∏nj=1 g
k2·e
j
i
j =k1 ·∏nj=0 g
k2·e
j
i
j
= k1 · gk2·∑
n
j=0 a je
j
i = k1 · g f (ei)·k2 = k1 · 1k2 = k1 and
hence message m can be decrypted correctly.
As the mobile ad hoc user group is dynamic, whenever
there is a join or leave of group member, simply add or
exclude that member’s ID during execution of Setup to
obtain a new encryption key tuple. Note that the pairing
computation for the ei values can be reused if the new join
member is a returning old member, only the encryption
key tuple is needed to recalculate. This can save a lot of
computation as pairing computations are expensive.
3.3. Security analysis
To prove our protocol is secure against IND-CPA, we first
assume that there exists an adversary A that wins in the in-
distinguishability experiment described in Subsection 3.1.
Then we create a simulator B that intercepts all the com-
munication between A and the challenger C , B is able
to modify and forward the communication contents and is
transparent to A and C making A see no difference be-
tween the simulator B or the real challenger C . The goal
of B is to make use of A to solve a cryptographic hard
problem. Since the hard problem is known to be unsolvable
in polynomial time, the assumption that A exists leads to
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a contradiction and hence our protocol is secure. We first
review the cryptographic hard problem that we will use in
the proof:
Bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (BDDHP):
given an instance (P,aP,bP,cP,θ), where P is a genera-
tor ∈ G1, a,b,c ∈ Z∗q are chosen uniformly at random and
θ ∈ G2. The goal for an attacker is to decide whether
θ = eˆ(P,P)abc within polynomial time. BDDHP is hard
with an assumption that there exists no polynomial time
algorithm for any attacker to solve BDDHP, such that the
probability of success is non-negligible.
We now construct the simulator B as follows (note that C
can be omitted here as B has simulated it):
1. B is given an instance (P,aP,bP,cP,θ) of BDDHP
as described above.
2. A picks a group of user IDs to be attacked and
tells B.
3. B runs the KGC’s Setup algorithm to generate
the necessary system parameters. The parameters
{G1,G2, eˆ,q,n,P,Ppub,F,H} are modified by B by
setting Ppub to cP before giving to A .
4. Whenever A issues a hash query on IDi, B replies
with his modified hash function F ′ using the follow-
ing method:
• B maintains a query list Flist : {IDi,ri,F
′
(IDi)}.
When the query on IDi has been asked before,
B looks up Flist to find the matching IDi and
replies with F ′(IDi).
• If the query on IDi has not been asked be-
fore, B first selects a random number ri ∈ Z
∗
q
and further checks that if IDi is one of the
IDs picked by A in Step 2. If it is, B sets
F ′(IDi) = riP+bP, else B sets F
′
(IDi) = riP.
• B updates Flist with the new entry and replies
A F ′(IDi).
5. Whenever A issues an extraction query on IDi, B
replies with his modified Extract algorithm using
the following method:
• If the query on IDi exists on Flist , B takes the
F ′(IDi) value and replies with SIDi = ricP.
• Otherwise B follows the hash query replying
method to create a new entry for IDi first then
replies with SIDi = ricP.
• Note that A is not allowed to query on the
IDs picked in Step 2. For extraction values,
hence F ′(IDi) is always in the form riP in Flist
and ricP = criP = cF
′
(IDi), which is a perfect
simulation of extraction value (since Ppub has
been replaced by cP).
6. At the time A provides two messages {m0, m1},
B picks one of them randomly to obtain b ∈ {0,1}
and looks up Flist for the ri values on the IDs picked
by A in Step 2. B runs the Setup algorithm of
our protocol to calculate the ei values for these IDs
by setting R = aP and ei = H(θ · eˆ(R,Ppub)ri). With
these ei values, B runs the Encrypt algorithm of
our protocol to encrypt the selected message mb and
sends A the ciphertext.
7. A can keep on querying if the total numbers of
queries have not exceeded qH and qE .
8. Eventually A will make a guess b′ ∈ {0,1} on which
message was being picked by B.
If the guess from A is correct (i.e., b′ = b), then B knows
that θ = eˆ(P,P)abc, otherwise B knows that θ 6= eˆ(P,P)abc.
This is because the ei values computed by B are able to
construct a valid ciphertext on mb.
Note that if A guesses it correctly, then ei = H(θ ·
eˆ(R,Ppub)ri) = H(eˆ(P,P)abc · eˆ(aP,cP)ri) = H(eˆ(aP,bcP +
ricP)) = H(eˆ(R,cF
′
(IDi))) = H(eˆ(R,SIDi)). For the above
construction of simulator B, we successfully show that B
can solve the BDDHP using the guess provided by A ,
which leads to a contradiction that BDDHP is unsolvable.
Hence the assumption that A exists is invalid and our pro-
tocol is secure. The other security properties mentioned in
Subsection 3.1 are straight froward: our IND-CPA proto-
col implies the group key secrecy. With two random val-
ues k1, k2 selected every time the new session key is broad-
casted, we ensure the known session key secrecy and key
control secrecy. Forward secrecy can be provided if the
group member who has lost his private key is promptly
informed to the group and the other group members can
simply exclude his ID from the Setup phase.
4. Conclusion
We proposed a new secure communication protocol for
mobile ad hoc networks. The protocol offers an efficient
setup algorithm, together with an efficient protocol for en-
crypting and decrypting the message among the ad hoc
group. Member joining or removal is also simple and quick.
With only one broadcast message, each member in the ad
hoc group can obtain a new group session key. The use
of ID-based cryptosystem provides an easy way to setup
our protocol and to include or exclude designated receivers
without interrupting the other group members, which
can be an advantage for greater flexibility.
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